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Monism and Meliorism
The Philosophical Origins of the Open Court
Nicholas L. Guardiano
 
1. Monism as Raison d’Être
1 The  philosophic  journal  The  Monist of  the  Open  Court  Publishing  Company  had  not
surprisingly  its  origin  in  monism,  that  is,  in  the  philosophy  of  monism.  From  the
inception of the journal in 1890 by its proprietor Edward C. Hegeler – a wealthy zinc
industrialist – this worldview emphasizing unity or oneness in the world governed the
journal’s  contents  and editorial  practices.  Perhaps more  surprising,  however,  is  that
monism played a major role in the founding and general  mission of  the Open Court
company  over  all.  The  establishment  of  the  publishing  company  was  catalyzed  by
Hegeler’s motive to promote his personal philosophic, religious, and moral ideas, which
he believed the philosophy of monism summed up. As he bluntly stated in a letter to his
first editor Benjamin F. Underwood, written in 1887 during the planning phases of the
company: “To me it is an earnest effort to give to the world a philosophy in harmony with
all facts (a monistic philosophy) which will gradually become a new religion to it, as it has
to me.”1
2 Hegeler’s agenda in the founding of his publishing company also involved the goal of
promoting a “religion of science” or of “conciliating religion with science.” The latter
phrase  would  become  the  subtitle  of  the  company’s  first  publication,  a  biweekly
magazine, named The Open Court. The program of “conciliation” involved – in this case by
definition and by intent – having a group of thinkers come to an agreement on a specific
idea. Hegeler further explains his motive to Underwood:
What leads me in this undertaking is not so much a sense of liberality, as a desire to
communicate my ideas to others, to see them further developed, and also to have
them contested. I feel they will be strengthened by contest, and look forward to it
with  pleasure  […].  The  character  of  the  journal  must  be  such  as  to  win  the
confidence of these specialists, and no effort or money be spared to secure their co-
operation.2
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The conciliation sought by Hegeler was the agreement of multiple persons on a single
idea, and that idea was monism. His strategic plan was to recruit a mix of specialists in
science, religion, philosophy, and other disciplines in order to set them on the common
task of developing the doctrine of monism. And given that doctrine was of a religious
nature to him,  he proposed that  “the first  case before the [open]  court  is  to be the
‘Monistic Idea’ vs. the ‘Agnostic Idea’.”3
3 Although this early history of the founding of the Open Court is unambiguous about its
mission, that mission began with only little support from its editorial staff. Prior to the
publication of The Monist as its flagship journal in 1890, Hegeler had recommended its
title as the name of his company’s first publication. Writing to Underwood in December
1886, two months before the release of their first issue, he says:
I  learn  that  the  time  has  come  when  we  have  to  publish  the  name  and  the
programme of the new magazine we are about to found, and I here give you the
conclusions I have come to: I adhere to the name, “The Monist,” as that conveys
most truly the leading idea I have in regard to this undertaking.4
The suggestion met with resistance by Underwood and his associate editor and wife Sara
Underwood.  The  two  were  outspoken  liberal  writers  involved  with  the  freethought
movement in the northeastern United States. Mr. Underwood – at the time completing
his sixth year as editor of the leftist weekly The Index run by Boston’s Free Religious
Association  –  promoted  a  secularism  and  agnosticism  (borderline  atheism)  while
engaging in frequent public debates with clergymen. Meanwhile, Mrs. Underwood was a
prominent  feminist  and  woman’s  suffragist.5 Given  their  strong  intellectual
commitments,  the Underwoods had serious reservations about the appropriateness of
Hegeler’s  new title  for  reflecting the  mission of  the  journal.  The name they offered
instead was the one that would stick, “The Open Court,” which Sara originally thought
up. It conveyed to the married couple a truly liberal agenda that was non-partisan and
welcomed all points of view. Mr. Underwood explained his reasoning to Hegeler:
[L]et us not narrow [the journal] at the outset by giving it a name which stands for
only  a  school  or  class  of  thinkers  [monism  or  monist]  […].  Let  the  name  be
comprehensive enough to include in its scope the consideration of every school and
system of philosophy.6
Hegeler attempted to compromise by proposing in return “The Monist’s Open Court,” yet,
since this title still made monism central, it also was not well received.
4 After a series of letters, Hegeler would eventually concede to the Underwoods regarding
the  title  of  the  magazine,  although  without  conceding  his  mission.  He  directed  the
Underwoods to include in the forthcoming pages of The Open Court a standing notice
maintaining an explicit statement about its monistic religious mission. Its first paragraph
would read:
The leading object of THE OPEN COURT is to continue the work of The Index, that is,
to establish religion on the basis  of  Science and in connection therewith it  will
present  the  Monistic  philosophy.  The  founder  of  this  journal  believes  this  will
furnish to others what it has to him, a religion which embraces all that is true and
good in the religion that was taught in childhood to them and him.7
This statement or a version of it appeared in the journal throughout its early history, and
thus Hegeler’s ideological intentions were publically made known from the beginning of
his  publishing  career.  Meanwhile,  the  remaining  of  the  standing  notice  attempts  to
incorporate some of the views of the editors, that is,  the Underwoods. It proposes to
synthesize monism and agnosticism, and to substitute “for blind faith rational religious
views, for unreasoning bigotry a liberal spirit,  for sectarianism a broad and generous
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humanitarianism.” All the while, the “Contributors are expected to express freely their
own views, [and] the Editors are responsible only for editorial matter.”8
5 Hegeler did not remain alone for long in the pursuit of his monistic agenda. When he was
attempting to establish his publishing company in La Salle, Illinois from 1886-7, he sought
a partner who agreed on the main doctrines of monism and would further them as the
raison d’être of the company. That is, while he needed a competent editor for his business
enterprise, he moreover needed an intellectual ally for his cause. Here the Underwoods
fell short. They were experienced and capable editors, but not advocates for monism,
especially not if it involved establishing any kind of religion. Soon enough, Hegeler came
to see them as dangerous agnostics  possessing a liberal  viewpoint  antithetical  to his
monism.9 The disconnect resulted in them resigning their positions after less than one
year, and Hegeler immediately filling the editorship enthusiastically with the German
philosopher and fellow German-American immigrant Paul Carus.
6 Hegeler  found  an  ideal  intellectual  partner  in  Carus:  someone  whose  philosophical
proclivities seemed commensurate with his own ideological inclinations. Prior to meeting
Carus – who was residing in New York at the time – his excitement was peeked upon
reading  Carus’s  philosophical  treatise  Monism  and  Meliorism:  A  Philosophical  Essay  on
Causality and Ethics (1885) and soon thereafter the short collection of poems Ein Leben in
Leidern: Gedichte eines Heimathlosen (A Life in Song: Poems of a Homeless Person, 1886). These
writings so captured Hegeler’s attention that they compelled him to invite Carus to La
Salle in order to help with The Open Court, as well as with the education of his children.
Hegeler’s first contact with Carus was by a letter written on 21 January 1887, only days
before the opening release of the magazine. Its message would change their lives and the
future of the publishing company.
Dear  Sir –  By  the  kind  sending  of  your  poems  through  our  mutual  friend,  Mr.
Underwood, you have given me much pleasure. The poems have brought you much
nearer to me. After I had already known you through your treatise “Monism and
Meliorism,” to receive poems from you was quite unexpected by me. 
I  should like much to have you nearer La Salle,  in order to have your help and
advice in the work on the new journal, and I have been thinking if not a suitable
position could be found for you in this vicinity. I must also mention that recently
Mr. Salter spoke of you as qualified to bring my religious-philosophical ideas into
shape for publication.
I  do not  know how you are  situated at  present;  philosophical  occupation alone
would probably not fill your time satisfactorily; perhaps you would take charge of
the education of older children. If so, there would be an opportunity for this here
[…].
Again, many thanks for your poems, also for your treatise “Monism and Meliorism”
which struck me very sympathetically, though I as a realist am but little acquainted
with philosophic terms. I shall be glad to hear from you soon.10
Carus had given expression to the philosophy of monism that Hegeler – a practically-
minded, “realist” entrepreneur and engineer – had deeply felt but could not sufficiently
articulate. In finding Carus, Hegeler found a voice in a professionally trained philosopher.
Hence, Hegeler made the impetuous decision to ask a man, whom he had never before
met, to move across the country and take a leading role in his personal business and
family life – all in the name of monism.
7 On the other hand, Carus found an intellectual ally and willing benefactor in Hegeler.
Carus had been forced to resign from his first career as an instructor in his homeland
Germany in 1881 upon falling out of favor with school authorities due to his unorthodox
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religious views. He then became an “exile” (exile) and “homeless person” (heimathlosen) –
in his words – emigrating to Belgium, England, and then to the eastern United States,
with his activities consisting in a mix of teaching, lecturing, and editing. Thus, after a
trying six-year period without consistent employment or residence, Carus finally found a
welcomed home in La Salle with the Hegeler family.11 This would provide a permanent
place to settle down and an environment for the development of his ideas.
8 Carus accepted Hegeler’s invitation, relocated from New York to Illinois, and began work
in his new capacities with the Open Court and Hegeler family. He was in La Salle by March
1887, in time to help with the first volume of The Open Court. He contributed an article to
the second issue of the magazine of March 3rd and contributed other articles to seven of
the  remaining  twenty  publications  that  year.  In  addition  to  his  contributions  as  an
author, he was immediately assisting with editorial matters. Thus, by December when the
Underwoods decided to resign, Carus was literally waiting in the wings of the editorial
office.  Moreover,  Carus  had made a  very personal  and intimate connection with the
Hegeler family during his first year in La Salle. He had become romantically involved with
Mr. Hegeler’s daughter, Mary Hegeler, and asked her hand in marriage.12 Come March the
following year, the two were husband and wife, and Carus was now Mr. Hegeler’s son-in-
law.
9 The new position as editor-in-chief and his relationship as a new family member would
sufficiently solidify his partnership with Hegeler. They set out during the coming years to
work  together  to  ground  the  Open  Court  on  the  principle  of  monism.  The  revised
standing notice of The Open Court appearing in the first issue under Carus’s editorship
succinctly expresses the intellectual terms of the partnership: “The Journal is devoted to
the work of conciliating Religion with Science. The founder and editor have found this
conciliation in Monism, to present and defend which will be the main object of THE OPEN
COURT.”13 These two sentences make a direct and unapologetic statement in comparison
to the multi-paragraph original  standing notice,  which winds together tenuously the
ideas  of  religion,  science,  monism,  agnosticism,  liberalism,  and  humanism.  With  the
Underwoods out of the picture,  Hegeler need no longer compromise and could move
forward unimpeded with his decided agenda for his publishing company.
 
2. The Open Court Philosophy
10 Monism  was  the  ideological  or  philosophical  ground  of  the  Open  Court  Publishing
Company; it served as the catalyst bringing together Hegeler and Carus as colleagues in a
joint effort. But, why monism, that is, what was significant about this philosophy over
others?  Moreover,  to  what  specific  kind of  monism did  Hegeler  and Carus  mutually
subscribe?
11 Carus’s book Monism and Meliorism is an ideal source for arriving at an understanding of
the monism of the Open Court. His biographer Harold Henderson says that the book “is
the best evidence we have of the thoughts that Paul Carus brought to La Salle and that
appealed  to  Edward C.  Hegeler.”14 Hegeler  found  his  own  intellectual  sentiments
expressed in the text and for this reason became convinced that Carus possessed the
qualifications to give proper shape to his personal worldview.
12 The book was Carus’s first in English, written during his early years as a philosopher.
Carus’s philosophical  career may be summed up as representing two (not necessarily
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mutually exclusive) theoretical poles: monism and the philosophy of form.15 With Monism
and Meliorism published in 1885 and The Philosophy of Form published in 1911, these texts
amount to culminating expressions in the evolution of his philosophy. From the time of
receiving his doctorate from the University of Tübingen (1876) through his early tenure
with the Open Court in the United States, the monistic philosophy was at the core of his
thinking. In addition to the book Monism and Meliorism, we see Carus’s preoccupation with
a monistic worldview across many writings: Metaphysik in Wissenshaft, Ethik und Religion:
Eine  Philosophische  Untersuchung (1881),  Ursache,  Grund  und  Zweck:  Eine  Philosophische
Untersuchung zur Klärung der Begriffe (1883), Principles of Art, from the Standpoint of Monism
and Meliorism (1886), “Monism, Dualism, and Agnosticism” (1887), “Monism and Religion”
(1888),” “The Oneness of Man and Nature” (1888), “The Religious Character of Monism: In
Reply  to  the  Criticism of  Dr.  Gustav  Carus”  (1888),  “The  Foundation  of  Monism”  in
Fundamental  Problems:  The Method of  Philosophy as a  Systematic Arrangement of  Knowledge
(1889), Monism its Scope and Import: A Review of the Work of the Monist (1891-2), “Monism Not
Mechanism:  Comments  upon  Prof.  Ernst  Haeckel’s  Position”  (1892),  and  “Professor
Haeckel’s  Monism”  (1892).  As  early  as  Metaphysik  in  Wissenshaft,  Ethik  und  Religion –
composed soon after receiving his doctorate and while still in Germany – Carus argues for
the  preeminent  place  of  monism  over  other  systems  of  metaphysics.16 Likewise,  in
Ursache, Grund und Zweck, he boldly states that monism is no less than “den wichtigsten
Grundpfeiler  einer  philosophisch-wissenschaftlichen  Weltanschauung” (“the  most  important
cornerstone of a philosophical-scientific worldview”).17
13 Another  notable  text  for  our  purposes,  among  the  many  listed  here,  is  the  article
“Monism, Dualism, and Agnosticism.” It appeared in The Open Court only two months after
Carus arrived in La Salle and is his first presentation of monism within the pages of the
journal.  Moreover, it was written under Hegeler’s close guidance. Hegeler had helped
prepare the article by proof reading and editing drafts prior to Carus submitting it to
Underwood for  publication.18 In  this  way  it  was  the  first  philosophical  collaboration
between Carus and Hegeler and was Carus’s first attempt at using his expertise in order to
give voice to Hegeler’s beliefs. 
14 Throughout his writings on monism, Carus provides explicit definitions of the philosophy
and frequently returns over the course of his discussions to its most fundamental tenets.
One definition appears on the opening page of the preface to Monism and Meliorism.  It
states: “We define Monism as a conception of the world which traces all things back to one
source,  thus  explaining  all  problems  from one  principle.”19 This  simple  statement  is
almost  tautological  since  it  does  not  describe  a  unique  kind  of  monism.  Rather,  it
indicates the general position common to all forms of monism, which is the grounding of
a multiplicity in some kind of unity. The definition also does not inform us about the
nature of the presumed monistic source, principle, or what have you. However, later in
the book, Carus fleshes out his view by arguing that the universal principle governing the
world is causality. By the law of causality Carus in effect distinguishes his position from
other versions of monism. This is one of two of his major theses. The other is meliorism,
which is an ethical position theoretically interconnected with monism. Together the two
doctrines comprise the systematic plan of the text: “Causality is the beginning, ethics the
aim and  end  of  this  philosophy.  These  two  points  being  fixed,  the  whole  system is
sketched in its outlines.”20 I will address each of these theories in turn. However, first it is
necessary  to  discuss  the  introductory  chapter,  where  Carus  presents  the  historical
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background he believes serves as foundation or “pedestal” for his systematic philosophy.
21
15 Monism and Meliorism begins by putting forth a quintessential philosophical problem: the
problem of dualism. An examination of Carus’s criticism of dualism allows for a proper
understanding  of  his  more  positive  doctrines,  since  he  proposes  these  as  necessary
solutions.  Dualism commits  itself  to  two distinct  fundamental  principles  or  forms of
reality. A classic historical example is Cartesian dualism that proposes that the human
being consists in mind and body and that the world as a whole is populated by the two
substances  of  mind  and  matter.  These  substances  are  incommensurate  because  the
former is a thinking, non-extended being and the latter is an extended, non-thinking
being. Carus will reject this dualism (among others) because it does not account for the
interaction between the two entities given that they are ontologically distinct. However,
in his book, he primarily focuses his critical efforts on the dualistic tendencies not of
Descartes, but of those that he believes are present in Kant’s philosophical system. Some
of the dualisms that Carus identifies here consist in the following pairs: subject/object,
reason/feeling,  scientific  inquiry/religious  faith,  a  priori  knowledge/a  posteriori
knowledge,  optimism/pessimism,  ideal/real,  necessity/freedom,  natural  law/moral
obligation.  A  major  goal  for  Carus  is  to  expunge  these  dualistic  flaws  from  Kant’s
revolutionary philosophy, so to advance a progressive reconstruction of it in a philosophy
of monism.
16 Carus’s motives here have an important historical context in the philosophical currents
of the second half of the German nineteenth-century. His student years and subsequent
teaching career in the 1870s and 1880s overlapped with the rise of neo-Kantianism in
Germany.  During  his  residence  at  the  universities  of  Greifswald,  Strasbourg,  and
Tübingen, as a student, and then subsequently in gymnasia and the military academy in
Dresden, as a teacher, academicians of the likes of Kuno Fischer (1824-1907), Friedrich
Lange (1828-75), and Otto Liebmann (1840-1912) had been actively laying the foundations
for a new approach to Kant.22 They and their peers were motivated by a strong reaction
against two major ideological trends that had become popular following Kant: on the one
hand, the speculative idealism of such thinkers as Fichte, Hegel, and Schelling, and, on
the other hand, the dogmatic scientific materialism of such figures as Karl Vogt (1817-95),
Heinrich  Czolbe  (1819-73),  and  Ludwig  Büchner  (1824-99).  In  light  of  the  perceived
failings of these developments since Kant, Fisher and Liebmann advocated for a return to
the writings of the Sage of Königsberg and a reassessment of their actual doctrines and
critical methods. As a sign of the times, Liebmann in his book Kant und die Epigonen (1865)
ended  each  chapter  with  the  emphatic  refrain:  “Thus  we  must  go  back  to  Kant.”
Following upon such impulse, by the 1890s two schools of neo-Kantianism would emerge,
each  advocating  their  own  way  of  returning  to  Kant:  the  Marburg  School  with  its
predecessor  Lange  and  main  representatives  Hermann  Cohen  (1842-1918)  and  Paul
Natorp (1854-1924); and the Southwest or Baden School with its predecessors Fischer and
Hermann Lotze (1816-81) and main representatives Wilhelm Windelband (1848-1915) and
Heinrich  Rickert  (1863-1936).  From  a  historiographical  perspective,  albeit  a
generalization, the two schools can be seen in opposition whereby the former attempted
to clarify Kant’s views and adhere to his methodical practices, and the latter attempted to
explore the wider implications of Kant’s ideas to contemporary culture.23
17 Carus left his native homeland in 1881, before the establishment of any distinct school of
neo-Kantianism,  which  would  continue  into  the  first  two  decades  of  the  twentieth
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century. For this reason alone, he is not a card-carrying “neo-Kantian.” Furthermore,
despite Carus’s time in Germany overlapping with the rise of the movement, his early
writings make almost no explicit  reference to its  figures,  texts,  or internal  academic
debates,  which  were  numerous and  created  fierce  forms  of  partisanship  across  the
universities. Nevertheless, when assessing Carus’s relationship to neo-Kantianism and its
origins, we should keep in mind Klaus Köhnke’s observation that, viewed from within, the
rising movement was hardly perceptible and consisted in heterogeneous currents flowing
together of which “not one of the active participants in this process understood itself as
part  of  a  more  comprehensive  movement.”24 The  bottom  line  is  that  Carus’s  first
philosophical ideas were born out of the same intellectual, social, and political milieu that
came to define the neo-Kantians,  and,  as we might expect,  they share with the neo-
Kantian  program  the  effort  to  make  recourse  to  Kant  while  critically  assessing  the
philosophical trends post-Kant.
18 A general spirit of neo-Kantianism is evident in Monism and Meliorism that takes Kant’s
philosophy as its starting point. The first chapter is a review of Kant’s critical project –
both its theoretical and practical sides – in historical perspective, as a response to the
insights of Enlightenment philosophy. Carus there echoes one of Kant’s most influential
ideas  by  cautioning  against  the  dangers  of  speculative  reason  and  by  showing  a
commitment to grounding scientific knowledge on a priori truths. The idea was a major
point of emphasis with his German contemporaries who focused on epistemology as a
systematic concern. Notably, Fischer in his influential writings on Kant sought to define
the precise boundaries of reason using a critical idealism that attacked the materialistic
presuppositions  of  natural  science  and  attempted  to  reground  scientific  knowledge
exclusively on the a priori forms of cognition.25 However, for Carus, even Fischer, “who is
perhaps  the  most  impartial  interpreter”  of  Kant,  does  not  recognize  one  of  the
fundamental principles of Kant’s philosophy; this is its dualism. 26 Carus explains that
Fischer among other scholars overlook the combination of the “antagonistic principles”
of  “Materialism” and “Spiritualism” inherent  in the Kantian system.  These drive the
contrary worldviews of the Critique of Pure Reason and Critique of Practical Reason, that is,
the contrast between a thoroughly deterministic physical world, on the one hand, and a
practical world of freedom that also admits God and the immortality of the soul, on the
other  hand.  Prior  to  Kant,  the  history  of these  antagonistic  principles  lead  to  the
opposition between British skepticism – stemming from Locke and Hume – and German
dogmatism – stemming from Leibnitz and Wolf. And now in the post-Kantian era, they
reappear, “though more moderately […] in the Realism of modern science and the Idealism 
of transcendental philosophy.”27
19 Putting aside the question of the accuracy or novelty of Carus’s interpretations of Kant
and of the history of philosophy, his views nonetheless inform his philosophy of monism.
This  is  because  he  believes  that  Kant’s  dualism has  precipitated  a  state  of  partisan
scholasticism with conflicting and one-sided interpretations, thus setting the stage for a
unifying voice. In order to overcome our disagreements and truly reap the benefits of
Kant’s  insights,  we  must  first  acknowledge  that  his  philosophy is  truly  dualistic  and
second strive  to  reconcile  its  opposing  elements.  Thuswise  Carus  explains  that  Kant
successfully “incorporated the antagonistic principles of his time in his philosophy, [yet]
he left the working out of the solution to posterity.”28 That solution Carus envisions is the
unification of the principles in a theory of monism. To achieve this is the aim of his book.
On the other hand, the method of achieving the goal is Kant’s own method, which is
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“actually a principle of justice.”29 This method preserves each side of an issue and treats
neither as inferior nor superior to the others. Hence, Carus concludes his first chapter
with the following plan of action:
The following articles try to realize this ideal, and will prove, let us hope, that there
is more unity in the general plan of human reason than Kant supposed. Our monism
results in a contemplation of the world by which so many seemingly contradictory
truths are reconciled with each other: the ideal on the one side, with the real on the
other, logical deduction with empirical induction, religious faith with philosophic
and scientific inquiry, the inflexible causality with a higher teleology, and the rigid
law of necessity with freedom of will and morality.30
20 The  specific  dualism  of  religion  and  science  that  Carus  names  in  his  monistic
reconstruction of Kant’s philosophy is especially relevant to his future role as editor of
The Open Court. “Conciliating religion with science” was the stated aim of the magazine,
appearing in the subtitle and standing notice, and it was part of Hegeler’s mission in
founding the publishing company. Carus’s attention to this problem must have appealed
to Hegeler when reading Monism and Meliorism. As future business partners, the two men
will  both  insist  on  the  imperative  to  reconcile  this  dualism,  along  with  the  parallel
dualism of feeling and reason. As Carus puts it in his book, the reconciliation is necessary
in order to avoid falling into an extremism of either “radicalism” or “dogmatism,” each
prioritizing one aspect of the dualistic pair over its counterpart. Radicalism, for Carus, is
the atheistic view rejecting religious faith in an over commitment to reason. On the other
hand,  dogmatism  is  the  superstitious  view  rejecting  scientific  truths  in  an  over
commitment to feeling. These alternative positions are furthermore expressions of the
greater  historical  antagonisms  of  Materialism/Spiritualism  and  Realism/Idealism,
opposing worldviews brought into full relief by Kant’s varying approaches in his Critiques.
In accordance with the “method of justice,” Carus takes neither of these views to be
satisfactory  alone,  and instead seeks  a  balanced position in  establishing  a  scientific-
religious philosophy that holds a comprehensive view of human nature.
21 Carus’s solution to dualism that equally incorporates two fundamental principles may be
deemed “neutralism,” recalling Charles Peirce’s description of neutralism as a kind of
faux monism. From at least 1890 onward, Peirce was attentive to the happenings of the
Open Court and the philosophical efforts made by Carus; he found he shared similar ideas
with Carus, yet also had critical objections to others. In his 1891 article “The Architecture
of Theories” for The Monist,  Peirce describes neutralism as that brand of monism that
holds  physical  law  and  psychical  law  to  be  both  independent  and  primordial.
Furthermore, he rejects the theory stating: “Neutralism is sufficiently condemned by the
logical maxim known as Ockham’s razor, i.e., that not more independent elements are to
be supposed than necessary. By placing the inward and outward aspects of substance on a
par, it seems to render both primordial.”31 Peirce’s own metaphysics, rather, is a monism
of “objective idealism.” Unlike neutralism and materialism (the third version of monism),
objective idealism is the “one intelligible theory of the universe”; it holds psychical law to
be primordial to physical law and “matter is effete mind.”32 Although Peirce does not
name Carus or anyone in particular as a neutralist, his remark in “The Architecture of
Theories” has a not minimal probability of having him in mind amongst others, since the
two were by then corresponding on philosophical issues. In addition, Peirce’s explicit
comment on Carus’s monism in his review of the first issue of The Monist published in The
Nation shows that he finds Carus’s position to share a point of confusion similar to the
doctrine  of  neutralism.  There  he  claims  that  Carus’s  definition  of  monism  is  “no
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definition of monism at all” and that it inappropriately opposes itself to idealism and
materialism, whose meanings Carus misunderstands.33
22 There is more to Carus’s monism that “traces all things back to one source” than a mere
diplomatic perspective that adjudicates a middle ground between theoretical extremes.
For him, there is a monistic source of all things, that is, there is an ontological principle of
unity. The article “Monism, Dualism, and Agnosticism” makes this clear: monism is the
“conception of the world which traces being and thinking, the object and the subject, matter
and force back to one source, thus explaining all problems from one principle.”34 What is
this  one  “source”  or  “principle”?  Carus’s  answer  is  causality,  which he  submits  as  a
positive solution to the reductive extremes that stem from dualistic thinking. “Causality
is the keystone of all  philosophic difficulty,  and all  other problems depend upon the
solution of this query […]. There is no problem in the empire of the human mind, which is
not more or less connected with causality.”35 Also, the nature of causality is foremost an
objective and universal law strictly governing all events necessarily. It governs not only
physical interactions but also mental processes. In addition to this ontological role, Carus
understands causality to play an epistemological role. Causality in this sense is the basis
on which we reason in our efforts to discover truths about the world. This is because
knowledge,  in  the  physical  sciences,  psychological  sciences,  and  other  disciplines,
consists in identifying causal relationships.
23 These two senses of causality appear in Carus’s synopsis of the three essential doctrines
of monism. The so-called “trinity of monism” states:
Monism means, 1. a unity of source to which it traces the origin and explanation of
all  things  and  phenomena  both  spiritual  and  material,  2.  a  unity  of  principle
animating the whole world,  arranging the order of  motion or the mechanics of
causality,  and  3.  a  unity  of  its  finis [end].  There  is  everywhere  the  same  goal,
whither the development of evolution tends.36
This  trinity  covers  the  scope  of  monism as  a  systematic  enterprise,  referring  to  its
method, metaphysics, and ethics, respectively.37 The first aspect I have already discussed,
and the third aspect I will address below in terms of the doctrine of meliorism. At any
rate, all three aspects make evident that a causal monism is Carus’s answer to the problem
of  dualism.  The  unities  of  “source,”  “principle,”  and “finis”  each indicate  a  unity of
causality. For instance, the unity of the principle of causality has a universal presence in
the world and thus unites under one natural law the diversity of beings both physical and
psychical. In this way Carus imagines his monistic thesis to achieve a fully comprehensive
theory of the universe.
24 Carus’s pronouncements on a causal monism in Monism and Meliorism follow up his claims
made in Metaphysik in Wissenshaft, Ethik und Religion on the deeper metaphysical nature of
causality.  In  section 14,  “Das  Metaphysische,”  he  assumes  the  traditional  Kantian
distinction between two worlds: “the metaphysical” world as an unknowable thing-in-
itself and the phenomenal world of physical objects in space and time. He notes that the
thing-in-itself has been variously interpreted in the history of philosophy as Spinoza’s
causa sui, Hegel’s Absolute, and the mystic’s God. Although Carus tells us that it is the
height of human arrogance to speculate about it – like the “flight of Icarus” – he does not
altogether  dismiss  the  thing-in-itself  as  a  nonsensical  idea. Rather,  he  maintains  its
reality and states it is “das ‘An sich’ und der letzte Grund der Dinge” (“the ‘In-itself’ and the
ultimate  Ground  of  Things”).38 He  adds  that  the  metaphysical  world  “becomes  the
physical” world, and as “the common Root” of the forms of space, time, and the laws of
nature, it is “Necessity” or “Causality.”39 These speculative metaphysical remarks about
Monism and Meliorism
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, IX-2 | 2017
9
causality  go well  beyond a  statement  of  its  mere epistemological  role  in  structuring
experience and grounding knowledge. In the Kantian-inspired treatise on metaphysics,
causality  is  associated with –  whether  successfully  or  unsuccessfully  –  the necessary
relationships  between  phenomenal  events  in  space  and  time,  as  well  as  with  the
primordial relationship between the phenomenal and metaphysical worlds, whereby the
latter is the ultimate source of the former.
25 Carus’s  deterministic  worldview was  no passing thought.  While  Metaphysik  shows his
interest in causal determinism prior to writing Monism and Meliorisim, his publications in
the 1890s and beyond continue to do the same. For instance, he emphatically returns to it
in several articles published in The Monist from 1892-3. In these articles he passionately
defends his  position against  challenges made by Peirce.  Peirce’s  own view is  that an
element  of  absolute  chance  or  spontaneity  with  no  degree  of  conformity  to  law  is
inherent in the world – a doctrine he calls “tychism” from the Greek word for “chance.”
He supports  this  position in his  Monist  article  “The Doctrine of  Necessity Examined”
(April 1892), which presents a series of arguments intended to refute “necessitarianism”
(Peirce’s  term  for  determinism).  Despite  Peirce’s  cogent  arguments  that  show
necessitarianism to be untenable, Carus was stalwart in his position. As a result, the two
philosophers began to debate the issue back and forth in a series of letters and Monist
articles. Initially, Carus countered Peirce by publishing “Mr. Charles S. Peirce’s Onslaught
on the Doctrine of Necessity” (July 1892), and then three months later publishing “The
Idea of Necessity: Its Basis and Its Scope” (October 1892). The following year, Peirce would
respond with “Reply to the Necessitarians: Rejoinder to Dr. Carus” (July 1893) and Carus
immediately  again  with  “The  Founder  of  Tychism,  His  Methods,  Philosophy,  and
Criticisms: In Reply to Mr. Charles S. Peirce” (July 1893), both published in the same issue
of The Monist.
26 The debate covering five articles and a total of 165 printed pages is too complex to fully
consider here – it duly deserves a complete study unto itself40 – yet a quality of Carus’s
defensive posturing is noteworthy. While distinguishing his philosophy from Peirce’s, he
expresses the strength of his commitment to a traditional Kantian view of causality. In
“Onslaught” he entrenches himself in a kind of Kantian a priori argument in order to
justify his necessitarianism.
The doctrine of necessity, let us not be afraid to pronounce it clearly, is of an a priori
nature. The scientist assumes a priori, i. e. even before he makes his observations or
experiments, as a general law applicable to every process which takes place, that,
whatever  happens,  happens  of  necessity  in  consequence  of  a  cause  and  in
conformity  to  law,  so  that  the  same  cause  under  the  same  circumstances  will
produce the same effects.41
All natural laws, including the law of causality, Carus claims are known a priori, not as a
“natural belief” or “innate idea,” but as “simply and solely formal knowledge, such as
2 x 2 = 4, to which we attribute universality and necessity.”42 As a consequence of the a
priori character of natural laws, they furthermore are “eternal,” unchanging forms of the
knowing subject, or facts of nature known “sub specie aeternitatis.”43 On these grounds,
Carus also contradistinguishes his position from Peirce’s view of natural laws as products
of evolutionary growth existing as regularities or “habits” of the universe.
27 In an effort to thoroughly cover his basis against Peirce, Carus also adds that his a priori
method of fixing the truth of necessitarianism is not equivalent to the “a priori method”
of inquiry Peirce features in “The Fixation of Belief” (1877). There Peirce shows that the
“a priori method” is unscientific because it determines conclusions in accordance with
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one’s subjective inclinations, rather than in accordance with a community of like-minded
inquirers. Carus concurs that such a method would not settle upon a set of consistent and
reliable beliefs, given the multitude of individuals with their varying interests. Hence, he
accordingly chastises it for bringing about the death of science, philosophy, morality,
and,  worst of  all,  for leading to the dreadful position of agnosticism.44 Ironically and
despite his  passionate tone here,  Carus’s  response appears  not  to recognize that  the
validity of his own a priori method remains under the burden of proving itself other than
subjective. The question remains: What evidence is there for a deterministic universe
beyond Carus’s own personal inclinations for the truth of his causal monism? Or, in terms
of his Kantian presuppositions: What proof is there that we possess an indubitable formal
knowledge of the absolute law of causality?
28 Carus remained a committed determinist to the end of his life. As the decades passed, he
never ceased his contention with Peirce’s tychism. In a letter to Peirce written in 1913,
when Carus was 61 years of age, he expresses his interest to republish their Monist debate
as a standalone volume.45 Also, in his final systematic work The Philosophy of Form,  he
continues to present a Newtonian conception of an objective world order that is strictly
governed  by  universal and  eternal  laws.  Consequently  he  would  hastily  dismiss  as
incredulous Einstein’s revision of Newtonian mechanics and theory of special relativity
with its relativistic views of space, time, and matter.46
29 The third important way in which Carus understands causality, beyond its ontological
and  epistemological  modes,  constitutes  the  third  part  of  his  “trinity  of  monism.”  It
conceives causality as a force guiding the ends toward which phenomena are directed.
That is, it is a theory of final causality, and Carus applies it to ethics. The concept of final
causality historically traces back to Aristotle, who spoke of final causes in nature when,
for instance, referring to the natural places toward which the elements move. Kant also
employed  the  idea  when  describing  the  intentionality  of  human  action  and  the
“purposiveness” of natural organisms. Following Kant, the German idealist G. W. F. Hegel
used final causality in his account of human history as teleological. These philosophers
and others who believe in the reality of final causality make up the historical background
to Carus’s appropriation of it to his ethics of meliorism.
30 The final chapter of Monism and Meliorism covers this last leg that completes the system of
monism. Just as Carus seeks to overcome the dualisms between Materialism/Spiritualism
and Realism/Idealism, he seeks to overcome any split between philosophies that limit
themselves to admitting the reality of only one of the two opposing types of causality,
namely causa efficientes and causa finales.  The theoretical move once again follows the
neutralistic  program  of  promoting  a  balanced  perspective,  in  this  case  by
comprehensively admitting the reality of both types of causes.
31 Carus’s position here will ground his ethical claims, and he makes it palpably clear while
distinguishing  his  brand  of  monism  from  the  monism  of  Ernst  Haeckel.  Haeckel’s
naturalism rejects  the  existence  of  all  spiritual  entities  and  supernatural  powers;  it
affirms all that exists are nature and mind, the physical and psychical, and these are
united under one set  of  natural  laws.  Consequently,  Haeckel  considers  the knowable
world to form a single unitary whole for scientific inquiry.  To this  extent,  Haeckel’s
monism is similar to Carus’s. However, Carus diverges from Haeckel regarding Haeckel’s
“mechanicalism”  or  mechanism,  which  only  admits  the  reality  of  efficient  causality
throughout the operations of the universe. Haeckel assumes that not only physical things
but  psychical  things,  as  well  –  biological  organisms,  life,  feelings,  and  ideas  –  are
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reducible to mechanistic processes exclusively governed by efficient causes.  Haeckel’s
naturalism thus  fits  the profile  of  “materialism,”  as  defined by Peirce’s  list  of  three
possible forms of monism: materialism takes “the psychical law as derived and special,
the  physical  law alone as  primordial.”47 Carus’s  neutral  monism,  on the  other  hand,
accepts the reality of both mechanical and purposive processes, efficient and final causes.
For him, the two types of causes coexist in the universe and are compatible by each
having their own domain of application: efficient causality applying to the mechanistic
world of physical bodies, and final causality applying to the psychical world of ideas and
feelings.  The latter,  for  Carus,  are  subjective states  of  consciousness  and not  merely
motions of the physical brain, as Haeckel claims.48
32 Given this systematic background of Carus’s theory of causality, we can best understand
the specific doctrines of his ethics. Meliorism holds a unity of final cause shared by all.
That is, the world populated by all its diverse beings moving in all their diverse ways
naturally possesses “a unity of its finis [end]. There is everywhere the same goal, whither
the development of evolution tends.” Moreover, this final end will be “the amelioration of
the present state,” that is, a future state that is superior to past states.49 The presence of
such a melioristic or progressive trend in the universe is most evident in the historical
growth of human civilization. This historicist idea was not uncommon in the nineteenth
century,  and Carus and Hegeler converged on it  in their separate ways.  Hegeler also
presents the view in his lecture “The Basis of Ethics,” which was delivered before the
Society for Ethical Culture in Chicago and later published as an article in the first issue of
The Open Court. He states that the “greatest good” is to “[p]reserve and evolve the human
form of  life,”  and  scientifically  defends  the  thesis  on  the  basis  of  the  physiological
structure  of  the  brain.50 As  colleagues  working  together  to  establish  an  Open  Court
philosophy, both men thus jointly envisioned a natural course of history in which the
overall condition of civilization and the human form is steadily improving.
33 Furthermore, the two thinkers concur that the final amelioration is not in the form of an
increase in personal happiness but in the form of an increase in the general moral state of
humanity. Carus says:
We do not live to be happy. Our inmost nature compels us to perform some tasks in
the service of some thing higher than our personal existence, be it in the field of
science or art, be it by inventions or by extending trade and commerce or by the
propagation  and  education  of  posterity;  in  one  word,  be  it  by  any  progress  or
improvement, we are compelled to do some thing in the service of humanity.51
Hence, the ethics promulgated by the Open Court does not advocate individuals seek
personal  pleasure or engage in creative pursuits  for themselves.  Rather,  it  advocates
individuals serve the greater good of humanity in the long run, whether or not their
efforts happen to benefit their present lives.
34 The ethics of meliorism reveals another dimension of Carus’s reconstruction of Kant’s
philosophy and dualistic tendencies. There is a unity of principle to the ethical life by
moral  progress  existing  simultaneously  as  a  natural  law  and  practical  imperative.
Whereas Kant draws a divide between the phenomenal and noumenal realms on the basis
of his dichotomous concepts of nature and morality, Carus aims to unite these dualisms.
That is, whereas the Kantian philosophy claims that nature is exclusively governed by
necessary laws and that morality is exclusively governed by freedom of will, the monistic
philosophy strives to unify the (seeming) disparity. As Carus puts it: monism is the theory
of the unity of the “must” and “ought.” The “must” corresponds to the necessary path that
history must follow toward its ameliorative end. It is fixed by an unbreakable law, rather
Monism and Meliorism
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, IX-2 | 2017
12
than open to the arbitrary decisions of human beings. The “ought,” on the other hand,
corresponds to the ethical demand ordaining that human beings should strive to bring
about that higher end of history regardless of the immediate consequences. Thus, the
right thing to do is to work diligently to achieve the moral progress of humanity, whereas
it is wrong to pursue one’s personal benefit or to live a life of moral indifference.
For a life worthy to be lived is one that is full of active aspiration, for something
higher and better; and such a contemplation of the world we call meliorism. Let the
world be bad! our duty is to work with steady labor for its improvement.52
35 Carus and Hegeler in their co-written article “Monism, Dualism, and Agnosticism” saw
that one consequence of such a monistic ethics is that it is against “individualism”: the
belief that the “individual soul is an ultimate unit,” a “little God.”53 Rather than monads
in possession of their own substantial nature,
single individuals are transient things which consist of the ideas they think and the
ideals they aspire for […]. It is not the individual who is an independent existence,
but humanity which lives in the individual; and the great ALL lives in humanity.
The  individual  is  only  one  insignificant  and  transient  state  of  the  great
development of human kind, it is one little link in the unmeasurable chain of life.54
From  the  perspective  of  meliorism,  the  individual  is  subordinate  to  the  greater
development of humankind; it is merely a means for the universal growth of humanity.
Historical precedence for this idea is found in Hegel’s teleological view of history. For
Hegel history is  the concrete embodiment of the development of geist,  which strictly
follows a rational plan toward a fixed end. The specific individuals appearing in history
are inconsequential to the deterministic process that advances along discrete stages and
types of  Western society.  While  Hegel  admits  the existence of  a  few special  “World-
historical individuals” who are representatives of geist at a particular stage, even they are
ultimately reducible to the societal norms and greater spiritual forces of world history.
36 As with the monism of the Open Court, the meliorism of the Open Court was not a unique
innovation in  the  history  of  philosophy.  In  addition to  its  theoretical  affinities  with
Hegel’s philosophy of spirit,  it  shares a family resemblance to an American strand of
meliorism.  Meliorism  was  a  live  idea  in  the  United  States  in  the  nineteenth  and
subsequent twentieth centuries, as witnessed in the writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson,
George  Ripley,  Margaret  Fuller,  the  abolitionists,  Peirce,  William James,  John Dewey,
Charlotte Perkins Gilman, Jane Addams, W. E. B. du Bois, Martin Luther King Jr., Richard
Rorty, Cornel West, and numerous other philosophers and progressive thinkers. A well-
known formulation of the doctrine appears in James’s Pragmatism and affirms the power
of human action to affect positive change in an inherently imperfect world. Specifically,
for James, meliorism consists in an attitude midway between the extremes of optimism
and pessimism, between a “tender-minded” and a “tough-minded” disposition. Whereas
the former believes the salvation of the world is inevitable and the latter believes the
salvation of the world is impossible, the meliorist believes in the possibility of improving
the conditions of life from a cautiously optimistic point of view.55 The family resemblance
between  James’s  meliorism  centered  on  human psychology  and  Carus’s  meliorism
centered on a cosmological  principle of final  causality only goes so far.  James’s anti-
fatalistic presupposition and focus on the power of the individual psyche contrasts with
Carus’s historical determinism, anti-individualism, and general Kantian framework of a
deontological ethics based on duty. A limited resemblance is also the case with the action-
oriented pragmatists after James. While challenging traditional conceptions of domestic
life, labor relations, race, gender roles, and other societal norms, they sought to reform
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problematic living conditions for the betterment of society. As with James, they promoted
self-control  in  the  shaping  of  one’s  personal  destiny,  rather  than  abeyance  to  a
foreordained historical fate.
37 Beyond these psychological and social-political forms of meliorism, a metaphysical form
appears in Peirce’s philosophy. While exchanging ideas with Carus over his 1890 Monist 
articles, Peirce was formulating an evolutionary cosmology of his own on the basis of his
tychism.  Peirce  hypothesizes  at  the  end  of  “The  Architecture  of  Theories”  that  the
universe  as  a  whole  is  growing  from  a  state  of  pure  indeterminacy  to  a  state  of
determinacy, “a chaos of unpersonalized feeling” sporting in arbitrariness to an absolute
reign of law and reason.56 Fueled by the spontaneous energy of tychism, the growth of the
universe is “hyperbolic,” that is,  always in a state of incipiency with the potential to
develop in novel ways. In addition, its growth is “variescent” by the generation of an
endless variety of novel forms, which themselves flourish forth in the stimulation of more
and more novel forms, ad infinitum. In this evolutionary universe, individuals may partake
in the creative process by embodying its results in the discovery of new scientific ideas,
expressions of works of art,  innovations in technology, and the establishment of new
ways of life.57
38 Once  again  Peirce  proves  a  formidable  interlocutor  for  Carus  on  the  metaphysical
underpinnings  of  his  philosophy.  In  contrast  to  Peirce’s  hyperbolic  universe,  Carus’s
“parabolic” universe is strictly determined and a closed system, tending on the whole
toward a single foreordained state. Explicitly calling out Carus by name, Peirce in the
final  article  of  his  Monist series,  “Evolutionary  Love,”  critiques  Carus’s  melioristic
universe as a degenerate form of evolution.58 For Peirce, there are three historical modes
of evolution: (1) evolution by fortuitous variation (tychasm – Darwin), (2) evolution by
mechanical  necessity  (anancasm  –  Hegel,  Carus),  and  (3)  evolution  by  creative  love
(agapasm – Henry James Sr., Peirce). The essential flaw of anancasm, such as found in
Carus’s meliorism, is that it does not admit a “living freedom” in its conception of reality
as intrinsically  good.  It  also lacks a  guiding principle of  love to advance its  forward
progress by self-less acts, instead operating on the basis of a principle that austerely deals
out pre-established destinies. Peirce’s agapism, on the contrary, makes central a cosmic
principle of love that nurtures the seeds of living freedom and supports the formation of
new evolutionary forms as unique autonomous creations.59
39 Meliorism provides the final leg of Carus’s monism as he formulated it at the time of the
founding of the Open Court. As we have seen, Hegeler agreed with and embraced Carus’s
philosophy,  and  this  lead  him  to  nominate  Carus  as  his  personal  ambassador  for
establishing monism as the ideological foundation of his publishing company. However,
prior to meeting Carus and discovering his philosophical writings, Hegeler had already
arrived  at  an  idea  of  monism  through  his  own  amateurish  reflections  and  made
independent attempts to explain it in writing. An examination of the writings by the
owner of the Open Court further fleshes out the company’s philosophical origins.
40 Hegeler expresses his view of monism in a few different places: his early planning letters
to Underwood, the original standing notice of The Open Court, and two Open Court articles,
“The Basis of Ethics” (1887) and “What the Monistic Religion is to Me” (1888).  These
writings make one thing clear: that a defining factor of Hegeler’s interest in monism is his
personal religious belief. He candidly tells Underwood in one of his planning letters:
The programme of the paper we should be perfectly clear about. To me it is an
earnest  effort  to  give  to  the  world  a  philosophy  in  harmony  with  all  facts  (a
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monistic philosophy) which will gradually become a new religion to it, as it has to
me.60
This religious intention Hegeler goes on to voice publically in the first standing notice of
The Open Court. There he states that the mission of the journal is to recruit the principles
of monism in order to “establish religion on the basis of Science.” This original form of
the mission statement contains a subtle difference from the one expressed in the revised
standing notice, as well as in the journal’s subtitle, appearing under Carus’s editorship,
that simply seeks “conciliating Religion with Science.” The original suggests a goal that is
more blatantly religious than the revision that suggests a goal that is more neutral or
impartial toward religion and science.
41 While  corresponding  with  Underwood,  Hegeler  also  takes  a  stab  at  articulating  a
metaphysical theology that would ground his “new religion” while interpreting a passage
from the Christian Bible. He explains that the
name, “The Monist,” conveys the idea given in the New Testament in the passage,
“For in Him we live and move and have our being,” when the meaning of the word
Him or  God,  which  is  that  of  a  person  or  individual,  that  is  a  limited  being  is
enlarged in accord with our present knowledge to that of  the continuous “All,”
which includes everything, also ourselves.61
Hegeler’s  interpretation  suggests  a  kind  of  pantheistic  worldview  that  takes  human
beings and all other natural beings as immanently residing in the divine substance. In
other words, creation is one with the creator, the world one with God, and as such the
two realities form a continuous whole or “All.”62 Hegeler returns to this view in his article
“What the Monistic Religion is to Me,” which argues that the dualistic presuppositions
implicit in our language are false. Terminological distinctions between “God” and “the
universe,” “soul” and “body,” “force” and “matter” are merely “abstractions,” whereas
the truth is  that these “complementary parts […] together form the whole reality.”63
Hence, “All that exists,  ourselves included, forms a great interacting whole, the most
satisfactory name for which to me is the ‘All.’ Our relation to the All is like that of a snow-
crystal  to  the  ocean.”64 Although Hegeler  will  say  that  the  best  way to  describe  the
ultimate monistic  reality is  to use the term “All”  rather than “God,” he nonetheless
continues to give it a religious connotation: “Religion, I was taught, is the union between
ourselves and God through God.”65
42 The religious aspect of Hegeler’s monism also appears in his articulation of the ethics of
meliorism. He describes the theory in his own words in “The Basis of Ethics,” which
probably was in part influenced by his reading of Carus’s Monism and Meliorism around the
time  of  its  composition.66 Hegeler  argues  that  the  human  race  is  undergoing  an
evolutionary development and that the greatest good takes the form of a kind of spiritual
“immortality” in which our ideas are preserved by future generations. In this manner the
human “soul” attains new heights  from generation to generation.  Moreover,  Hegeler
believes  that  science  “gives  us  the  conviction  […]  that  evolution  is  taking  place
throughout the universe – that God and the universe are one – are the continuous ALL of
which  man  is  a  limited  part  and  phenomenon.”67 On  this  cosmological  model,  the
progressive development of humankind is part of a greater world theodicy, and our finite
contribution at any moment in history amounts to doing the will of God. Hegeler thus
believes that “fundamentally the old religious dogma ‘that is good or right which is the
will of God’ is true.”68
43 Last but not least, Hegeler’s religiosity occurs in his emphatic disdain for agnosticism. In
the title of his article, jointly composed with Carus, “Monism, Dualism, and Agnosticism,”
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he  names  his  arch-enemy,  while  Carus  names  dualism  as  Carus’s.  For  Hegeler,  the
problem with agnosticism is that it  denies the possibility of knowledge of a spiritual
reality, and thus it is the ultimate antithesis to his faith in religion and consequently his
religious monism. From the very beginnings of the Open Court, he drew a line in the sand
between  agnosticism  and monism.  The  dichotomy  would  serve  to  frame  his  initial
discontent  of  and final  antagonism toward Underwood,  with his  liberalism and non-
commitment ideology. Hegeler had accused Underwood of being agnostic throughout the
entire time of  their business partnership.  This was despite Underwood defending his
philosophical proclivities as partially monistic. When the two were disagreeing over the
name for the journal, Underwood once wrote Hegeler explaining:
I believe that all phenomena, distinguished as mental and material have a common
basis, in the ultimate nature of things. But when I say that I do not know what this
ultimate nature is, I am in the company with Spencer and Huxley, with Haeckel and
Buechner, even, as well as with Kant.69
This sort of skeptical monism was not good enough for Hegeler. Dispatching Underwood
after a year for his designs in “the agnostic character of the paper,” he tells the readers of
The  Open  Court  that  agnosticism  is  “detrimental  to  the  progress  of  knowledge  and
injurious to mankind in general. That I wanted to eradicate this idea, I had prominently
pointed out to Mr. Underwood.”70
44 Hegeler’s religious monism adds to our account of the philosophical origins of the Open
Court, although it is not precisely commensurate with Carus’s causal monism. In Monism
and Meliorism and surrounding writings, God and spirituality do not prominently feature
in Carus’s solution of a world thoroughly and necessarily governed by the laws of cause
and  effect.  “Causality  is  the  law  of  cause  and  effect,  and  nothing  else,”  Carus
unambiguously states with no qualifications.71 While his conclusion is clear, it seems to
fall short of his stated goal to equally incorporate the ideas of science and religion in a
reconstruction  of Kant’s  dualistic  philosophy.  Carus’s  own  father  Gustav  Carus  –  a
Lutheran pastor and church superintendent – was of the same opinion concerning his
son’s philosophy. He inveighed against Paul’s monism for being irreligious, as well as for
accepting certain unknowables, that is, for being agnostic!72 Statements made in Monism
and Meliorism further contrast with Hegeler’s views, such as its criticism of “dogmatism,”
the one-sided religious perspective departing from the impartial conciliation of religion
with science on equal terms. Hegeler’s zeal for a “new religion” of monism and reluctance
to seriously entertain non-religious viewpoints arguably cross the line into dogmatism
defined as such. In general, thus, Hegeler’s interest in monism combines with a religious
perspective that is in some ways at variance with Carus’s sense of monism. It involves a
deep existential commitment not found in Carus’s formal philosophical presentations and
diplomatic approaches to religion and science.
45 Nonetheless,  Carus  and  Hegeler  at  the  time  of  them  becoming  business  partners
recognized that they shared similar monistic worldviews – and indeed they did. The two
men were committed to metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical principles unifying
the multiplicity of the world: they sought to neither deny nor subordinate the rational or
emotional  aspects  of  human nature;  believed that,  at  least  in  principle,  religion and
science were compatible;  and held a faith in the moral  evolution of  the human race
toward an ameliorative end. Their partnership in managing the Open Court was formed
on these intellectual grounds, and as the business moved forward over the years, Carus
would take the lead in promoting their shared philosophical views and defending them
against their adversaries.
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3. Epilogue: A Lesson in Meliorism
46 One final thought will round out the study of the philosophical origins of the Open Court.
It concerns the impact of Carus’s career as staff-philosopher of the Open Court on his own
philosophical  development.  What  impact,  if  any,  did  his  service  to  the  company  to
promote its monistic mission have on his actual philosophical proclivities? As it turns out,
the impact was significant.
47 Upon  assuming  his  position  as  editor,  Carus  would  immediately  amend  his  earlier
statements on monism to better reflect Hegeler’s religious stance and antagonism toward
agnosticism. This is evident by a mere examination of the titles of his new publications
following his hiring: “Science and Religion” (1887), “Monism and Religion” (1888), “The
Religious Character of Monism: In Reply to the Criticism of Dr. Gustav Carus” (1888), and
The Idea of God (1888). These publications were all released as follow ups to his first article
under Hegeler’s tutelage, “Monism, Dualism, and Agnosticism,” and before the end of his
first year as editor-in-chief. Starting with these texts, Carus, loyal to Hegeler, took hold of
a flag promoting a new “religion of  science” while fighting off  all  forms of  faithless
agnosticism.73 This marked a new phase in Carus’s philosophical development. Although
the topic of religion was not entirely absent from his early career writings composed in
Germany, it became a central topic of his research in the 1890s and beyond.74 As is well
known, he became a major advocate for the validity of different world religions and he
supported an international  dialogue between representatives  of  Western and Eastern
faiths,  as  conceived  in  his  Religious  Parliament  Extension,  successor  of  The  World’s
Parliament of Religions. He also amended his philosophical theories, such as by logically
coordinating the idea of God within his theory of causality. In The Idea of God and “The
Religious Character of Monism,” he defines God as the immanent “omnipresent order of
the Cosmos” and “a law of Nature.”75 Henderson explains that Carus “redefined ‘God’ as
the universal system of necessary laws discovered by science.”76
48 Yet, Carus simultaneously seemed aware that he was sacrificing some of his own personal
values while advocating for what he called Hegeler’s more “positive” agenda. In a candid
letter to Peirce in 1892,  he explains that his  duties to Hegeler conflict  with his  own
standards as a philosopher and an editor:
Mr. Hegeler is not narrower than I am, but I should say that he is more positive. I
would restrain editorial  interference to matters of principle only,  and leave the
working out of our aim to the contributors, admitting, however, the editor as one of
the contributors.  As such I  would often abide my time longer than I  do. So, for
instance, my proposition was to name the new quarterly “THOUGHT” and not “THE
MONIST”; but in Mr. Hegeler’s opinion, the name “THOUGHT” was unmeaning. He
regarded it as an attempt at being non-committal. He wants to have the solution
which he arrived at expressed unequivocally. The name of the journal is to him the
flag; while to me it would be an invitation to the class of people who are welcome to
contribute. Mr. Hegeler had the same objection to the name, “THE OPEN COURT.” I
shall be pleased to have your article for the Fall number of the MONIST.77
Peirce responded that Thought “would have been a superb” title.78 That name for Peirce
reflected the essence of an ideal community of inquirers who collectively pursue the
truth  in  and  for  itself,  without  any  ulterior  motives.  Peirce  and  Carus  both  fancied
themselves as participating in such a community. Testament to this is Carus’s welcoming
disposition to receive a new article by Peirce’s hand for the fall issue of the The Monist.
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That gesture was made in May, the time precisely after the publication of “The Doctrine
of Necessity Examined” and in the midst of the two philosophers quarreling over the
truth of determinism. Thus, despite vehemently disagreeing with Peirce on the topic,
Carus would not silence Peirce’s opinion and even welcomed its expression as one live-
option amongst the community of inquirers.
49 Carus’s  candid  admissions  to  Peirce  about  his  relationship  with  Hegeler  and  his
compromises as an editor reveal his true feelings about his assignment to promote an
Open Court  philosophy.  There  is  serious  irony  in  Carus  reiterating  the  same  liberal
positions as  his  predecessor Underwood with regard to the name of  the Open Court
journal and to its editorial practices. As we know, such a stance did not end well for
Underwood. Carus, however, managed to remain Hegeler’s right-hand man for the long
run. This was in part because, of course, his writings helped inspire and articulate the
monistic platform of the Open Court from its inception. Yet, it also seems it was due to
him  making  a  necessary  and  personal  act  of  conciliation  in  sacrificing  some  of  his
intellectual autonomy for a vision of the greater good. By this act he was in accordance
with  the  “must”  and  “ought”  of  the  melioristic  improvement  of  the  human  race
demanded by  his  and Hegeler’s  ethics  –  an ethics  of  monism,  then,  that  more  than
theoretically grounded the founding of the Open Court.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
BECK Lewis White, (1996), “Neo-Kantianism,” The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, New York, Simon &
Schuster Macmillan, 5-6, 468-73.
CARUS Gustav, (1888), “Christianity and Monism: A Criticism of the Work of ‘The Open Court’,” The
Open Court, 2, 44, 1381-4.
CARUS Paul, (1881), Metaphysik in Wissenshaft, Ethik und Religion: Eine Philosophische Untersuchung,
Dresden, R. von Grumbkow, Hof-Verlag.
CARUS Paul, (1883), Ursache, Grund und Zweck: Eine Philosophische Untersuchung zur Klärung der
Begriffe, Dresden, R. von Grumbkow, Hof-Verlag.
CARUS Paul, (1885), Monism and Meliorism: A Philosophical Essay on Causality and Ethics, New York, F.
W. Christern.
CARUS Paul, (1887), “Monism, Dualism, and Agnosticism,” The Open Court, 1, 8, 209-12.
CARUS Paul, (1888), “The Religious Character of Monism: In Reply to the Criticism of Dr. Gustav
Carus,” The Open Court, 2, 44, 1381-4.
CARUS Paul, (1889), Fundamental Problems: The Method of Philosophy as a Systematic Arrangement of
Knowledge, Chicago, The Open Court Publishing Company.
CARUS Paul, (1890), “The Vocation,” The Open Court, 3, 46, 2027-8.
CARUS Paul, (1891-2), Monism its Scope and Import: A Review of the Work of the Monist, Chicago, The
Open Court Publishing Company.
Monism and Meliorism
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, IX-2 | 2017
18
CARUS Paul, (1892a), “Monism not Mechanism: Comments upon Prof. Ernst Haeckel’s Position,” 
The Monist, 2, 3, 438-42.
CARUS Paul, (1892b), “Charles S. Peirce’s Onslaught on the Doctrine of Necessity,” The Monist, 2, 4,
560-82.
CARUS Paul, (1892c), “Professor Haeckel’s Monism,” The Monist, 2, 4, 598-600.
CARUS Paul, (1896 [1888]), The Idea of God, Chicago, The Open Court Publishing Company.
CARUS Paul, (1913), “The Monism of ‘The Monist’: Compared with Professor Haeckel’s Monism,” 
The Monist, 23, 3, 435-9.
THE CHARLES S. PEIRCE PAPERS, Houghton Library, Cambridge.
FLYNN Tom, (2007), “Underwood, Benjamin Franklin (1839-1914),” The New Encyclopedia of Unbelief,
Amherst, Prometheus, 775.
GOEBEL Julius, (1919), “Paul Carus,” The Open Court, 33, 9, 513-21.
GUARDIANO Nicholas L., (2011), “The Intelligibility of Peirce’s Metaphysics of Objective Idealism,” 
Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia, 12, 2, 187-204.
GUARDIANO Nicholas L., (2017a), Aesthetic Transcendentalism in Emerson, Peirce, and Nineteenth-
Century Landscape Painting, Lanham, Lexington Books.
GUARDIANO Nicholas L., HACKBART-DEAN Pamela & Aaron C. LISEC, (2017b), An Independence of Ideas
and Thought: The Life of Mary Hegeler Carus, Carbondale, Saluki Press.
HAY William H., (1956), “Paul Carus: A Case-Study of Philosophy on the Frontier,” Journal of the
History of Ideas, 17, 4, 498-510.
HEGELER Edward C., (1887a), “The Basis of Ethics,” The Open Court, 1, 1, 20-1.
HEGELER Edward C., (1887b), “To the Readers of the Open Court,” The Open Court, 1, 22, 621-40.
HEGELER Edward C., (1888), “What the Monistic Religion is to Me,” The Open Court, 1, 25, 725-6.
HENDERSON Harold, (1993), Catalyst for Controversy: Paul Carus of Open Court, Carbondale, Southern
Illinois University Press.
HENDERSON Harold & André W. CARUS, (2005), “Carus, Paul (1852-1919),” The Dictionary of Modern
American Philosophers, Bristol, Thoemmes Continuum, 1, 445-9.
HOLTON Gerard, (1993), “From the Vienna Circle to Harvard Square: The Americanization of a
European World Conception,” in Stadler Friedrich (ed.), Scientific Philosophy: Origins and
Developments, Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers.
HOLZHEY Helmut & Vilem MUDROCH, (2005), Historical Dictionary of Kant and Kantianism, Lanham,
The Scarecrow Press.
JENSEN Anthony K., (2017), “Neo-Kantianism,” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
http://www.iep.utm.edu/neo-kant/, September 8, 2017.
KÖHNKE Klaus Christian, (1991), The Rise of Neo-Kantianism: German Academic Philosophy between
Idealism and Positivism, Hollingdale R. J. trans., Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
LOHNE Raymond, (2012), “Mary Hegeler Carus (1861-1936),” Immigrant Entrepreneurship: German-
American Business Biographies, 4, [http://immigrantentrepreneurship.org/entry.php?rec=109].
Monism and Meliorism
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, IX-2 | 2017
19
OLLIG Hans-Ludwig, (1998), “Neo-Kantianism,” Michael J. & Walker N. trans., Routledge
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 6, London, Routledge, 776-92.
THE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING COMPANY RECORDS, Morris Library, Carbondale.
RUETENIK Tadd, (2008), “Meliorism,” American Philosophy: An Encyclopedia, New York, Routledge,
498-500.
RYAN W. F., (1985), “Underwood, Benjamin Franklin (1839-1914),” The Encyclopedia of Unbelief,
Buffalo, Prometheus, 2, 677-9.
SHIN Kee Soo, (1973), “Paul Carus’s ‘Positive Monism’ and Critique of Other Types of Monism
(Mach, Haeckel, Peirce),” Ph.D. diss., Temple University.
URBAS Joseph, (2016), Emerson’s Metaphysics: A Song of Laws and Causes, Lanham, Lexington
University Press.
WILLEY Thomas E., (1978), Back to Kant: The Revival of Kantianism in German Social and Historical
Thought, 1860-1914, Detroit, Wayne State University Press.
THE WORKS OF WILLIAM JAMES, 19 vols., ed. Frederick H. Burkhardt, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge (1975-88).
WRITINGS OF C. S. PEIRCE: A CHRONOLOGICAL EDITION, 7 vols. published, ed. by M. Fisch et al., Indiana
University Press, Bloomington, 1982-.
NOTES
1. Hegeler (1887b: 624), Edward C. Hegeler to Benjamin F. Underwood, 19 September 1886.
2. Hegeler (1887b: 627-8), Hegeler to Underwood, 7 December 1886.
3. Hegeler (1887b: 627), Hegeler to Underwood, 3 December 1886.
4. Hegeler (1887b: 627), Hegeler to Underwood, 3 December 1886.
5. For biographical information on the Underwoods, see Ryan 1985 and Flynn 2007.
6. Hegeler (1887b: 629), Underwood to Hegeler, 7 December 1886.
7. Hegeler (1887a: 15).
8. Ibid.
9. In section 3 below, I return to Hegeler’s disdain for agnosticism in his relationship with the
Underwoods.
10. Hegeler (1887b: 639), Hegeler to Paul Carus, 21 January 1887.
11. For biographical accounts of Carus’s early life, see Shin (1973: 18-32), Henderson (1993: 7-11),
and Henderson & Carus 2005.
12. Mary Hegeler Carus was an exceptional person in her own right and broke through many
gender barriers of her time. She oversaw as a young girl  some of the operations of the zinc
smelters at her father’s business, the Matthiessen & Hegeler Zinc Company; was the first woman
to graduate with a bachelor’s degree in engineering from the University of Michigan; was one of
the  first  two women to  be  admitted  to  and to  complete  a  degree  from –  despite  not  being
awarded it because of her gender – the Bergakadamie Freiberg, a prestigious mining school in
Germany; became the president of the M&H Zinc Company upon her father’s death; and became
the editor-in-chief of the Open Court upon her husband’s death. For a biography of her life, see
Lohne 2012 and Guardiano et al. 2017b.
13. Hegeler (1887b:  621).  This first  appearance of the new standing notice in the issue of 22
December 1887 was the final issue of the year.
14. Henderson (1993: 14).
Monism and Meliorism
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, IX-2 | 2017
20
15. See Henderson & Carus (2005: 447). For a succinct account of Carus’s monism in relation to
his later writings and philosophy of form, see Hay 1956.
16. See esp. Carus (1881: sec. 17).
17. Carus (1883: 43); my translation.
18. See Hegeler (1887b: 636), and Henderson (1993: 37).
19. Carus (1885: 5).
20. Carus (1885: 7).
21. Ibid.
22. On Carus’s education and teaching career, see Henderson (1993: 4-5) and Goebel (1919: 513).
23. For  more  on  the  rise  of  neo-Kantianism,  its  schools,  and  main  figures,  see  Willey  1978,
Köhnke 1991, Beck 1996, Ollig 1998, Holzhey & Mudroch 2005, and Jensen 2017.
24. Köhnke (1991: 137).
25. See Köhnke (1991: 124-35). Carus will also reject materialism in his early writings; see Carus
(1881: sec. 17) and Carus (1885: 80).
26. Carus (1885: 12).
27. Ibid.  For more on Carus’s  understanding of  the terms materialism, spiritualism, idealism,
realism, and others, see the appendix of definitions in Carus (1885: 78-83).
28. Carus (1885: 12-3).
29. Carus (1885: 15).
30. Carus (1885: 27-8).
31. W8: 106.
32. Ibid.
33. W8:  43.  For  more  on  Peirce’s  critique  of  neutralism,  including  its  possible  further
identification with  the  philosophies  of  Ernst  Mach and Baruch Spinoza,  see  Guardiano 2011.
Mach had an extensive correspondence with Carus and published numerous articles and books
with the Open Court.  For a brief  note on their relationship,  see Holton (1993:  48-50).  Holton
brings to light Carus’s generosity as an editor by promoting Mach’s writings to America and the
English-speaking world. However, in his excitement to show that Carus “clearly revered” Mach,
he hastily associates Carus’s philosophy with Mach’s positivistic and anti-metaphysical stance,
and even claims that Carus held an agnostic monistic worldview. On the contrary, Carus’s monism
is a form of neutralism incorporating both scientific and religious sentiments. Furthermore, as
we  have  seen,  he  promoted  the  Open  Court’s  primary  agenda  of  conciliating  religion  with
science, and in this regard was indispensable ally to Hegeler, who took agnosticism as scourge of
his publishing company.
34. Carus (1887: 209).
35. Carus (1885: 29).
36. Carus (1885: 62).
37. See Shin (1973: 103),  which explains the theoretical comprehensiveness of monism under
these three aspects.
38. Carus (1881: 24); my translation.
39. Carus (1881: 25); and see Carus (1881: secs. 2 and 17). Contrary to Carus, the neo-Kantians
Fisher and Leibmann reject the idea of the thing-in-itself as a nonsensical idea. Carus’s view thus
appears closer to those of Hermann von Helmholtz and Lange who take the objects of experience
to exist as products of the metaphysical thing-in-itself interacting with the sense and cognitive
capacities of the human organism. On the neo-Kantian history here, see Beck (1996: 469) and
Köhnke (1991: 163-4).
40. Shin (1973: chap. 5) makes a start of a complete study.
41. Carus (1892b: 563).
42. Carus (1892b: 564).
43. Carus (1892b: 578).
Monism and Meliorism
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, IX-2 | 2017
21
44. See Carus (1892b: 569-72).
45. See Paul Carus to Charles S. Peirce, 10 September 1913, The Charles S. Peirce Papers (L77:
251-2); and Paul Carus to Francis C. Russell,  5 January 1918, letterpress of original, The Open
Court Publishing Company Records (box 91, folder 7).
46. See Henderson (1993: 146-7).
47. W8: 105.
48. See the following articles published in The Monist  for Carus’s debate with Haeckel on the
theory of  monism: Carus 1892a,  Carus 1892c,  and Carus 1913.  Also,  Shin treats at  length the
subject of Carus’s monism vis-à-vis Haeckel’s monism in Shin (1973: chap. 3).
49. Carus (1885: 53).
50. Hegeler (1887a: 20-1). This article, originally delivered as a lecture on 14 January 1887, was
printed with revisions in the first  issue of  The Open Court on 17 February 1887.  Although its
composition occurred prior to Carus arriving in La Salle, it is highly probable that Hegeler’s ideas
were directly influenced by Carus’s ethical discussions in Monism and Meliorism, since the week
after the lecture on 21 January Hegeler first wrote to Carus praising his book.
51. Carus (1885: 69).
52. Carus (1885: 71).
53. Carus (1887: 211).
54. Ibid.
55. See WWJ1: 12-4, 60-1, and 136-8. For a general discussion of the topic of meliorism in the
greater pragmatist tradition, also see Ruetenik 2008.
56. W8: 110.
57. For  a  full  discussion  of  these  creative  aspects  of  Peirce’s  evolutionary  cosmology,  see
Guardiano (2017a: chap. 3).
58. See W8: 192, footnote 2.
59. Ralph Waldo Emerson’s cosmic meliorism shares much in common with Peirce’s agapism. It is
a metaphysics of cosmic proportions involving the metamorphic ascension of things towards
higher  and  higher  forms.  For  a  trenchant  account  of  it,  see  Urbas  (2016:  163-4);  also,  see
Guardiano (2017a: chap. 1, sec. 3).
60. Hegeler (1887b: 624), Hegeler to Underwood, 19 September 1886; my emphasis.
61. Hegeler (1887b: 627), Hegeler to Underwood, 3 December 1886.
62. Carus at a later date while articulating the theological underpinnings of his and Hegeler’s
joint philosophical perspective will reject pantheism although not panentheism. Pantheism takes
God to be one with creation, in the sense that God’s entire being is exhausted by the reality of
nature,  whereas  panentheism  takes  God’s  being  to  ultimately  extend  beyond  the  reality  of
nature. See e.g. Carus (1885: 63) and Carus (1896: 26-33).
63. Hegeler (1888:  725).  Carus likewise takes the opposing elements of  dualism to be merely
conceptual “abstractions” from an original unitary reality; see e.g. Carus (1891-2: 7) and Carus
(1889: 18).
64. Hegeler (1888: 725).
65. Ibid.
66. See n. 50 above.
67. Hegeler (1887a: 21).
68. Hegeler (1888: 725).
69. Hegeler (1887b: 629), Underwood to Hegeler, 7 December 1886.
70. Hegeler (1887b: 636).
71. Carus (1885: 45). One exception in this text occurs during Carus’s argument against the idea
of  God as  first  cause of  the universe.  There he seems amenable  to  associating God with the
principle of causality itself. He states: “We reject and condemn, therefore, the idea of a first cause
in the sense of Creator, as a contradiction in itself. And those who call God the first cause have
Monism and Meliorism
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, IX-2 | 2017
22
either a vague idea of what they mean, or they intend to say that God is the final principle of the
world, the most general law, governing the whole universe, the fundamental basis, and, so to
speak, the ground on which everything rests, from which all existences spring and originate, and
the ultimate reason to which we trace the existence of the cosmos. Such a principle, or whatever
other name you may be pleased to give it [read: e.g. “God”], is not a passing cause, which happens
once and exists no longer, but a living presence, which pervades the whole world, and is the
operating force in all causes and the causation in causality” (ibid.: 46). For a similar comment
appearing in a text after Monism and Meliorism,  see Carus (1889:  17) where Carus equates the
“cosmical order of the Universe” with God.
72. Gustav’s views are expressed in his article Carus G. 1888.
73. For this transition in Carus’s career, see Henderson (1993: 45-7) and Carus (1890: 2027-8).
74. Carus  discusses  religion  in  his  early  career  writings  Metaphysik  in  Wissenschaft,  Ethik  und
Religion (1881),  Quid  est  Veritas?  Eine  Religiöse  Entwicklung  in  Gedichten  (1881),  and  Lieder  eines
Buddhisten (1882).
75. Carus (1896: 27), and Carus (1888: 1384).
76. Henderson (1993: 47).
77. Paul  Carus  to  Charles S.  Peirce,  31  May  1892,  The  Charles S.  Peirce  Papers  (L77:  16).  A
letterpress made from the original letter is in The Open Court Publishing Company Records (box
91, folder 11).
78. Charles S. Peirce to Paul Carus, 3 June 1892, The Open Court Publishing Company Records
(box 91, folder 11).
ABSTRACTS
In 1887 the Open Court Publishing Company had its founding in a philosophy of monism. The
company’s  proprietor  Edward  C. Hegeler  began  the  enterprise  in  an  effort  to  promote  his
personal philosophic, religious, and moral ideas. He believed that these ideas could be conciliated
with the growing scientific  trends of  the late nineteenth century,  and that  monism was the
intellectual framework for doing so. Paul Carus, the editor of the journals The Open Court and The
Monist, joined Hegeler as an intellectual ally in this regard. For thirty years he openly defended
the doctrines of monism in countless articles and books, successfully grounding the Open Court
on this philosophy. This paper uncovers the historical development of the philosophical origin of
the Open Court as it began with Hegeler’s personal religious motives, his ideological tension with
the original editor Benjamin Underwood, and his embrace of the monistic writings of Paul Carus.
It also examines Hegeler’s and Carus’s publications and personal letters from the 1880s and 1890s
in order to determine the fundamental doctrines of their unique sense of monism. In Carus’s
writings in particular is proposed a monism of causality that is compatible with a deterministic
worldview and a unitary conception of the sciences.  Also,  both Carus and Hegeler propose a
monistic ethics of meliorism that conceives the diverse periods of human history to be evolving
toward the one final end of the moral improvement of humankind. While these are the positive
doctrines  that  they  accept,  they  further  reject  the  antitheses  of  philosophical  dualism  and
irreligious attitude of agnosticism of all varieties.
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